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PersonalityRapid intuitive hunches or gut feelings may be a compelling source of evidence for paranoid ideas. Converse-
ly, a failure to apply effortful analytic thinking may contribute to the persistence of such thoughts. Our main
aim was to examine for the ﬁrst time the associations of persecutory thinking with experiential and rational
thinking styles. Five hundred individuals recruited from the general population completed self-report assess-
ments of current persecutory ideation, general reasoning styles and personality traits. Persecutory ideation
was independently associated with greater use of experiential reasoning and less use of rational reasoning.
The correlations were small. Persecutory ideation was also positively associated with neuroticism and nega-
tively correlated with extraversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness. There was no evidence of an inter-
action between neuroticism and experiential reasoning in the prediction of paranoia, but high experiential
reasoning in the context of low rational reasoning was particularly associated with persecutory ideation.
Overall, the study provides rare evidence of self-reported general reasoning styles being associated with delu-
sional ideation. Perceived reliance on intuition is associated with paranoid thinking, while perceived reliance
on deliberation is associated with fewer such thoughts. The dual process theory of reasoning may provide a
framework to contribute to the understanding of paranoid thinking.
© 2012 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
The process of making and revising judgements is of obvious im-
portance in understanding delusional beliefs. Two parallel systems
are considered to underlie decision-making: an effortless, bounded
rationality, rapid judgement and a slow, reﬂective, conscious, analytic
approach (e.g. Epstein, 1994; Evans and Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996;
Stanovich, 1999). The types of reasoning within dual process theory
have been called experiential and rational (or intuitive and reﬂec-
tive). Experiential reasoning, in contrast to rational reasoning, is
viewed as being closely tied to affect, and hence particularly compel-
ling. Emotional feelings are considered a key source of information for
rapid judgements that can outweigh more considered evaluations,
which is also seen in the related theoretical concepts of ‘risk-as-feeling’
and ‘the affect heuristic’ (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002). It
is our contention based upon clinical experience that quick decision-
making based upon feelings of fear are a signiﬁcant proximal contribu-
tor to the occurrence of paranoid thoughts. Individuals are closely
following their anxious physiological reactions, or gut feelings,
when suspicious thoughts come to mind. This clinical impression is
consistent with theoretical and empirical work indicating that indi-
viduals with delusions often need to make decisions about confusingaches to Psychosis (O-CAPS),
Hospital, Oxford, OX3 7JX, UK.
Freeman).
 CC BY license.and ambiguous experiences, that they have a tendency to jump to
conclusions, and anxiety is a predictor of paranoid thought occur-
rence (e.g. Garety and Freeman, 1999; Kapur, 2003; Freeman,
2007; Bentall et al., 2009; Ben-Zeev et al., 2010).
A self-report questionnaire of experiential (e.g. ‘I believe in trust-
ing my hunches’, ‘I like to rely on my intuitive impressions’) and ra-
tional (e.g. ‘I have no problem thinking things through carefully’
‘Using logic usually works well for me in ﬁguring out problems in
my life’) reasoning has been developed (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini
and Epstein, 1999). The Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) has
rarely been examined in relation to psychiatric problems, and has
typically been employed in studies of students. Of relevance to the
current investigation, experiential thinking has been modestly posi-
tively correlated with the occurrence of paranormal and superstitious
beliefs and schizotypal traits, with rational thinking showing an op-
posite pattern (e.g. Wolfradt et al., 1999; Aarnio and Lindeman,
2005; Genovese, 2005; Marks et al., 2008). The thinking styles have
also been studied in relation to the ‘Big Five’ personality traits
(McCrae and Costa, 1987). The results indicate similar small positive
correlations of the two thinking styles to the different personality
traits, except for neuroticism for which experiential reasoning has
not been found to be associated while rational thinking is typically in-
versely correlated (e.g. Pacini and Epstein, 1999; Marks et al., 2008;
Witteman et al., 2009). It is of note for establishing the independence
of rational and experiential styles that they typically do not correlate
with each other (e.g. Pacini and Epstein, 1999; Wolfradt et al., 1999;
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the two styles can be used by individuals.
Our aim in this study was to examine experiential and rational
thinking in relation to persecutory thoughts speciﬁcally. As this was
the ﬁrst examination of the issue we used the method of a cross-
sectional investigation in a large non-clinical adult population,
based upon the accumulating evidence that each of the separate psy-
chotic experiences is represented by continuous traits in the general
population (e.g. van Os et al., 2009; Freeman et al., 2010b). It was
predicted that paranoid thoughts would be positively associated
with experiential reasoning and negatively associated with rational
reasoning. The combination of experiential thinking without rational
thinking was predicted to be associated with the most paranoid
thinking. We also took the opportunity to examine for the ﬁrst time
the relationship of personality to persecutory thinking. We predicted
that neuroticism and persecutory thinking would be positively corre-
lated, because of the many studies indicating associations of anxiety
and depression with paranoia (e.g. Freeman et al., 2008; Thewissen
et al., 2011). Further we predicted that a reliance on experiential
thinking in the context of neuroticism (i.e. negative fearful feelings)
would particularly be associated with paranoid thinking. A clinical
importance of pursuing this line of inquiry is that it has the potential
to provide a framework, and a language, to use with patients in un-
derstanding how they came to paranoid interpretations of events.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
500 people from the city of Oxford took part in the study. The data were collected
during the screening phase for an on-going experimental study (for which only ap-
proximately 10% of respondents will be eligible). Our team sent leaﬂets to local post-
codes with the wording:
“Volunteers Required for Psychological Research. We are looking for volunteers to take
part in a medical research study being carried out at the university. The research
would take three hours and you would be compensated for your time. If you would
like to hear more about the research, then please contact us. We send detailed informa-
tion about the study so that you can consider whether you would like to take part.”
The individuals who responded were then invited to take part in the screening stage.
Depending on participant preference, the screening questionnaires were either sent
in the post or were made available via a web-link. According to the English Index of
Multiple Deprivation 2010, Oxford ranks 131st out of 354, placing it in the top half of
most deprived local authority areas in England. The unemployment rate in Oxford is
approximately 6.3%, below the national average of around 7.7%. Half of the city's jobs
are in the public sector and universities (double the average national rate).
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Paranoid Thoughts Scale Part B (GPTS-B; Green et al., 2008)
The GPTS-Part B measures persecutory ideation, as deﬁned by Freeman and Garety
(2000), over the past month. Each of the sixteen items in the scale (e.g. ‘Certain indi-
viduals have had it in for me’ ‘People have been hostile towards me on purpose’ ‘I
was sure someone wanted to harmme’ ‘I was convinced there was a conspiracy against
me’) are rated by the person on a 5-point scale (1–5). Scores can range from 16 to 80,
with 16 indicating the absence of persecutory ideation and higher scores indicating
greater persecutory ideation. The questionnaire has shown good psychometric
properties in both clinical and non-clinical populations, and been validated against
an experimental assessment of the occurrence of paranoid thinking (Freeman
et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2010b). In the present study the Cronbach's alpha of
the scale was .95.
2.2.2. Rational-experiential inventory (REI; Pacini and Epstein, 1999)
The REI is a 40-item measure of an individual's preference for two different think-
ing styles: rational and experiential. Each style is assessed using 20-item scales. Each
can be further broken down into 10-item subscales, assessing self-evaluated ability
in the given style (ability subscales) and reliance on and enjoyment of the given
style (engagement subscales). Items are rated on a ﬁve point Likert scale where 1 is
“completely false” and 5 is “completely true”. Examples of items from the rational
scale include, “I have a logical mind” (rational ability) and “I enjoy solving problems
that require hard thinking” (rational engagement). Examples from the experiential
scale include, “I trust my initial feelings about people” (experiential ability) and “I
often go on my instincts when deciding on a course of action” (experiential engage-
ment). Mean scores for each subscale can range from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating a lowability/engagement and 5 indicating a high ability/engagement for each thinking
style. Internal consistencies for the both the rational and experiential scales, and all
four ability and engagement subscales are high (e.g. Björklund and Bäckström, 2008),
as is the test-retest reliability of the scale (e.g. Handley et al., 2000). In the present
study the Cronbach's alpha for the experiential scale was .78, and for the rational
scale it was .73.
2.2.3. Newcastle personality assessor (NPA; Nettle, 2007)
The NPA is a brief measure of personality. Five dimensions of personality (extra-
version, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness) are assessed
by a total of 12 items rated on 5-point scales, with 1 being “very uncharacteristic”, 3
being “moderately characteristic” and 5 being “very characteristic”. Example items in-
clude: “planning parties and social events” (extraversion), “feeling stressed or wor-
ried” (neuroticism), “preparing for things well in advance” (conscientiousness),
“making sure others are comfortable and happy” (agreeableness), and “thinking
about philosophical or spiritual questions” (openness). Scores for each personality di-
mension are formed by summing the scores from the relevant two or three items.
Higher scores indicate a higher level of the personality trait. The NPA dimension scores
correlate with coefﬁcients of .7 or higher with those in the International Personality
Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006).
2.3. Analysis
Analyses were carried out using SPSS Version 19.0 (IBM, 2010). There were hardly
any missing data (0.4%), because incomplete questionnaire responses were prevented
for those using the website. 86% of participants did not have any missing data, while
only an average of 3.2% was missing from the other 14% of participants. Where one
or two items in a scale were missing these scores were prorated. The Paranoid
Thoughts Scale scores were transformed (log to the base 10) to reduce signiﬁcant
skew, and the transformed data were used in the analyses. No other variable needed
to be transformed. Summary mean scores of the measures were calculated and basic
associations with demographic variables examined using Pearson correlations and
analysis of variance. Associations between paranoia, reasoning style and personality
were then initially examined using Pearson correlation coefﬁcients. A multiple regres-
sion analysis was then used to test the ability of experiential and rational thinking to
predict paranoia scores, which was repeated controlling for demographic variables.
Analysis of variance was used to test for an interaction between experiential reasoning
and neuroticism. In a secondary analysis to test for potential combinations of reasoning
style we constructed four groups (see Epstein, 1998; Wolfradt et al., 1999): high expe-
riential/low rational, high experiential/high rational, low experiential/low rational, low
experiential/high rational. Participants were allocated into high or low rational or ex-
periential thinking based on whether they were above or below the 50th percentile
on each scale. The four groups were tested for differences in levels of paranoia and neu-
roticism using analysis of variance, with post hoc least signiﬁcant difference tests. Sig-
niﬁcance test results for all the analyses are quoted as two-tailed probabilities.
3. Results
3.1. Demographic information
The participant group comprised 210 males and 290 females, with
a mean age of 45.7 years (S.D.=20.2). 199 participants were single,
167 were married or in a civil partnership, 50 were divorced, 47
were co-habiting, and 32 people were widowed. The ethnicities of
the groupwereWhite (n=447), Black Caribbean (n=3), Black African
(n=6), Indian (n=7), Pakistani (n=6), Chinese (n=4), and other
(n=25). The highest level of education reached by participants were
none/GCSE (n=50), A-level (n=135), degree (n=180) and post-
graduate (n=134). 81 participants reported having been diagnosed
or treated for a mental illness.
3.2. Assessment scores
The measure summary scores for the participants are displayed in
Table 1. As expected, paranoid thoughts decrease with age, r=−
0.28, pb0.001. Experiential reasoning total scores did not vary by
educational level, F (3, 495)=0.41, p=0.744, but rational reasoning
total scoreswere lowest in those with the lowest education and highest
in those with postgraduate degrees, F (3, 495)=13.41, pb0.001.
3.3. Associations with paranoid ideation
Table 2 displays the associations of the Paranoid Thoughts Scale
with the measures. Higher levels of paranoid thoughts were
Table 1
The mean scores on the measures (N=500).
Measure Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Paranoid Thoughts Scale Part B 21.1 9.5 16 76
Experiential Total 6.6 1.2 2.8 10.0
Rational Total 7.5 1.2 3.5 10.0
Experiential Engagement 3.3 0.7 1.1 5.0
Experiential Ability 3.3 0.7 1.3 5.0
Rational Engagement 3.8 0.7 1.7 5.0
Rational Ability 3.7 0.7 1.0 5.0
Extraversion 6.5 1.9 2.0 10.0
Neuroticism 6.1 2.1 2.0 10.0
Conscientiousness 7.3 2.1 2.0 10.0
Agreeableness 12.8 1.8 5.0 15.0
Openness 10.3 2.5 3.0 15.0
Fig. 1. Mean paranoia scores by the interaction of experiential and rational reasoning
styles.
121D. Freeman et al. / Psychiatry Research 197 (2012) 119–122associated with greater experiential reasoning and less analytic rea-
soning. The experiential and rational scales did not signiﬁcantly cor-
relate with each other. Paranoid thoughts were also associated with
the presence of neuroticism. When experiential and rational scores
were entered into a linear regression with paranoid thoughts as the
dependent variable the model was signiﬁcant, F (2,497)=8.32,
pb0.001, Adjusted R Square=0.03. Experiential reasoning, B=0.02,
standard error=0.005, p=0.004, and rational reasoning, B=−
0.02, standard error=0.005, p=0.003, each independently predicted
paranoia. They remained signiﬁcant predictors of paranoia when con-
trolling for age, gender, ethnicity, and education. In an analysis of vari-
ance, there was no evidence in the prediction of paranoia scores of an
interaction between experiential thinking and levels of neuroticism
(p=0.865).
Looking at the potential combinations of the two styles, the highest
paranoia scores were in the individuals with high experiential/low ra-
tional scores, and the lowest paranoia scores were in those individuals
with low experiential/high rational scores (see Fig. 1). The mean para-
noia scores (SDs) for the groups were: high experiential/low rational
(n=126)=22.7 (11.1); high experiential/high rational (n=114)=
21.5 (9.3); low experiential/low rational (n=131)=20.9 (9.0); low
experiential/high rational (n=129)=19.5 (8.5). There was an almost
signiﬁcant group difference in paranoia scores, F (3,496)=2.53,
p=0.056, accounted for by the low experiential/high rational group
scoring signiﬁcantly lower than the high experiential/low rational
group (p=0.007). These groups also differed in levels of neuroticism,
F (3, 496)=7.66, pb0.001. The low experiential/high rational groupTable 2
Correlations between the measures (N=500).
Paranoid thoughts Experiential Total Rational Total
Experiential Total 0.12**
p=0.006
Rational Total −0.13** 0.04
p=0.004 p=0.411
Experiential engagement 0.14** 0.91*** −0.04
p=0.002 pb0.001 p=0.325
Experiential ability 0.09 0.91*** 0.11*
p=0.055 pb0.001 p=0.012
Rational engagement −0.11* 0.04 0.89***
p=0.018 p=0.424 pb0.001
Rational ability −0.12** 0.03 0.90***
p=0.006 p=0.496 pb0.001
Extraversion −0.10* 0.19*** 0.09*
p=0.025 pb0.001 p=0.049
Neuroticism 0.33*** 0.08 −0.23***
pb0.001 p=0.085 pb0.001
Conscientiousness −0.22*** −0.03 0.17***
pb0.001 p=0.447 pb0.001
Agreeableness −0.25*** 0.01 0.08
pb0.001 p=0.844 p=0.065
Openness 0.04 0.16*** 0.33***
p=0.326 pb0.001 pb0.001
* pb0.05, **pb0.01 , ***pb0.001.had lower levels of neuroticism than all three other groups
(pb0.05). In forming the four groups it is of interest that there was
no association of scoring high or low in rational thinking and scoring
high or low in experiential thinking, chi square (d.f.=1)=0.22,
p=0.636.
Interestingly we note that the individuals who reported a history
of mental illness (n=81) scored signiﬁcantly higher for levels of
paranoia and neuroticism but lower for levels of rational thinking
and extraversion compared with the other study participants
(pb0.05). There was no difference in experiential thinking between
those with a history of mental illness and the other participants
(p=0.905).
4. Discussion
In a large general population sample, the self-reported use of intui-
tive gut feelings was associated with higher levels of persecutory think-
ing,while the use of deliberative analytic thinkingwas protective. These
are novel ﬁndings. The associations were small, explaining little of the
variance in paranoia. However it should be borne in mind that it is
rare for a self-report of general reasoning style to be linked to delusional
ideation, and, moreover, the questionnaire items did not ask about rea-
soning in relation to the kinds of fearful feelings that are typically asso-
ciated with delusions. A reliance on experiential thinking is likely to be
signiﬁcantly exacerbated in anxiety-provoking situations. Consistent
with previous ﬁndings, rational and experiential thinking were found
to be independent reasoning processes. The combination of experiential
thinking without the check of rational thinking was most closely as-
sociated with paranoia.
There was a failure to ﬁnd a predicted interaction between expe-
riential reasoning and negative affective state. It was expected that
a use of gut feelings in the context of anxiety would be more likely
to result in paranoid interpretations of experience. However the as-
sessment of neuroticism was very limited, comprising just two
items, neither of which concerned the physiological components of
anxiety. An expected main effect of neuroticism and paranoia was
found. Higher levels of paranoia were associated with higher levels
of neuroticism. This is consistent with the theoretical idea that para-
noia and anxious affect are closely related via the process of threat an-
ticipation (Freeman, 2007). Personality traits have not, to our
knowledge, been speciﬁcally related before to persecutory thoughts.
However it is quite plausible that reports of lowered mood state,
less agreeableness, and lower extraversion are simply consequences
of having paranoid thoughts. The association of paranoia with lower
122 D. Freeman et al. / Psychiatry Research 197 (2012) 119–122conscientiousness is less expected however. We resist speculation on
this result until replication with a superior measure of personality.
The clear study weakness was the cross-sectional design. The as-
sociations could be explained by an unmeasured confounder, while
the direction of the relationships between reasoning styles and para-
noid thinking cannot be known. It would also have been of interest to
include more clinical variables such as global functioning and emo-
tional disorder. A further cross-sectional study in a group with delu-
sions in the context of psychotic conditions such as schizophrenia is
now warranted, although the optimal design would be to look longi-
tudinally at whether the reasoning styles predict the persistence of
delusional beliefs. Experimental or clinical studies testing whether
manipulating therapeutically the type of reasoning style alters the
course of delusions would be especially valuable (e.g. Freeman,
2011; Garety et al., 2011; Waller et al., 2011). It would also be infor-
mative to assess reasoning styles directly in relation to paranoid
thoughts. Of interest here is that in two studies rational coping with
suspicious thoughts has been linked with a lower frequency of para-
noid thoughts (Freeman et al., 2005; Lincoln et al., 2010). There are
also grounds to examine experiential and rational reasoning styles
in relation to the delusion-relevant factors of jumping to conclusions
and belief ﬂexibility (So et al., 2012), workingmemory (Fletcher et al.,
2011) and insomnia (Freeman et al., 2010a). It would also be intrigu-
ing to consider the neural correlates of the processing styles, for ex-
ample the potential links of experiential reasoning with the insula
(Singer et al., 2009). Clinically it is of note that cognitive therapy gen-
erally encourages analytic thinking in order to adjust problematic
judgements and moderate the inﬂuence of subsequent experiential
reasoning. It may prove helpful in cognitive approaches to psychosis
to distinguish directly with patients between experiential and ratio-
nal reasoning. Overall the study indicates that there may be merit in
the application of the dual process framework to delusions.
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